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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction over plaintiff's Appeal and defendants'
Cross-Appeal is proper in the Court of Appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann, , § 78-2a-3(2) (j) in that this matter been transferred
to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL PRESENTS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

I.

HAS THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET HIS BORDEN TO SHOW THAT THE
TRIAL1 COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT S RULING OF UNILATERAL MISTAKE WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS?

Standard of Review: A trial court's findings of fact
will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Hoth
v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

An appellant

must marshal 1 all evidence in favor of the facts as found by the
trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings of fact.
Sharp, 154 UAR 5 (Utah Feb. 12, 1991).

1

Saunders v.

II.

IS IT UNNECESSARY FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INTERVENE ON
THE ISSUE OF THE MEASURE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES?

Standard of Review:

Issue II presents a question of

law which is reviewed for correctness.

Saunders v. Sharp, 154

UAR 5 (Feb. 12, 1991).

III.

DOES THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM AN
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES?

Standard of Review: Issue III presents a question of
law which is reviewed for correctness.

Saunders v. Sharp. 154

UAR 5 (Feb. 12, 1991).

DEFENDANTS' CROSS-APPEAL PRESENTS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

I.

IS THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S
FRAUD INCONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT?
Standard of Review:

Issue I presents a question of

law which is reviewed for correctness.
UAR 5 (Feb. 12, 1991).

2

Saunders v. Sharp, 154

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves a dispute over the rescission of an
agreement to purchase a personal residence.

In about July of

1987, defendants, Mark and Kathryn Van Wagoner, responded to a
for sale sign which had been placed on a residence owned in fee
by plaintiff, John Klas. The sign was part of the marketing of
the property undertaken by plaintiff's ex-wife and agent, Carol
Klas.

After several conversations between Carol Klas and

defendants

concerning

the property

and

appraisals

of the

property, defendants and plaintiff entered into an earnest money
agreement for the purchase of the home.

Thereafter,

defendants

learned

that

the

representations made by Carol Klas were misleading and omitted
to disclose an existing,

low market value appraisal, and

defendants attempted to rescind the earnest money agreement. In
the course of a conversation with Klas1 counsel, defendants
understood

that the contract had been rescinded.

Later,

plaintiff refused to a written rescission of the agreement,
returned defendants' earnest money, sold the home and sued
defendants on the difference between the eventual sales price
3

and the sales price listed in the earnest money agreement with
defendants.
and

Defendants denied that there was a valid contract

counterclaimed

for

fraud

and

detrimental

reliance.

Thereafter, discovery ensued and then a trial was conducted on
May 9, 10 and 12, 1989.

On or about May 30, 1989, the trial court rendered its
memorandum decision and found in favor of plaintiff. Subsequent
to the memorandum decision of May 30, 1989, Findings of Fact,
Conclusion of Law and a Judgment were presented to the trial
court.

Objections were filed by defendants, together with a

Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Defendants also requested a new trial.

The trial court then entered a Supplemental Memorandum
Decision

on November

30, 1989, finding

unilateral mistake by the defendants.

that there was a

(Record at pp. 220-223).

The trial court then entered Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions

of

Law

based

on

its

Supplemental

Memorandum

Decision, dated May 31, 1990 and also rendered an Amended
Judgment, dated July 3, 1990.

(Record at pp. 309-312).

Plaintiff and defendants then filed their respective
Notices of Appeal.
4

II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Defendants1 dispute plaintiffs1 statement of facts and
offer the following:

1.

The property which is the subject of this action

is a parcel of real estate located at 2340 Berkley Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah.

(Amended Findings of Fact No. 1, Record at p.

298) .

2.

At all times relevant to the issues involved, the

plaintiff, John H. Klas, was the owner in fee simple of said
property.

(Amended of Findings of Fact No. 2, Record at p.

298) .

3.

In late July or early August, 1987, the subject

property was offered for sale pursuant to the terms of a Decree
of Divorce in Civil No. D-86-1705, in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

(Amended Findings of Fact No. 3,

Record at p. 298).

4.

Pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid Decree

of Divorce, the former wife of plaintiff, Carol Klas, undertook
the marketing of the property and said property was not listed
5

with a real estate broker.

(Amended Findings of Fact No. 4,

Record at p. 298).

5.

In 1986, plaintiff and his then wife, Carol Klas,

acquired an appraisal by Devere Kent for mortgage loan purposes.
That appraisal showed a market value of between $153,000 and
$165,000. The purpose of obtaining the appraisal was to secure
a second mortgage on the Klas1 marital residence.

(Transcript,

Volume I at page 32, lines 22-25).

6.
1987,

In anticipation of the sale of the property in

plaintiff

had

personal

acquaintances

provide

their

opinions on the current value of the property which plaintiff
and his wife, Carol Klas agreed to use, as a basis for
establishing the market value for the sale of the property.
Said opinions ranged from $175,000 to $192,000.

(Amended

Finding of Fact No. 5, Record at pp. 298-299).

7.

In late July or early August, 1987, the defendants

inspected the property

in the presence of Carol Klas and

expressed an interest in acquiring the property.
Finding of Fact No. 6, Record at p. 299).

6

(Amended

8.

As part of their initial contacts with Carol Klas

defendant, Mark Van Wagoner, specifically asked Carol Klas how
the property had been valued.

(Amended Finding of Fact No. 30,

Record at p. 305; Transcript, Volume II, at page 148, lines 1921) .

9.

In response, Carol Klas informed defendants that

three appraisals had been made in the range of $175,000 to
$192,000.

Although she was aware of its existence, Carol Klas

did not disclose the existence or amount of the Devere Kent
appraisal.

(Transcript, Volume I, at page 93, lines 9-15).

10. Carol

Klas

never

provided

defendants

with

information regarding the Devere Kent appraisal despite the
defendants1 specific inquiry regarding appraisals and their
request for copies of any of the appraisals.

(Amended Finding

of Fact No. 30, Record at p. 305).

11. Carol Klas informed defendants that John H. Klas
would not even entertain an offer that was below the lowest of
the appraisals.

12.

(Transcript, Vol. I, p. 182, lines 2-5).

On or about August 7, 1987, defendants presented

Carol Klas with an earnest money agreement for the purchase of
7

the home with an offered purchase price of $175,000, which they
understood to be the lowest value established by the three
appraisals disclosed to them.

(Transcript, Vol. I, p. 181,

lines 19-25, p. 182, lines 1-12).

13.

Carol Klas then presented defendants' offer to

her former husband, John H. Klas, who accepted it on August 11,
1987.

(Amended Finding of Fact No. 9, Record at p. 300).

14.

After

repeated

requests

for

copies

of

the

appraisals, plaintiff finally provided defendants a copy of the
Devere Kent appraisal and disclosed that in truth, he had no
other written appraisals. Defendants then sought to renegotiate
the earnest money based upon the belated disclosure of the only
written appraisal.

(Amended Finding of Fact Nos. 12 and 13,

Record at pp. 300-301).

15.

Thereafter,

plaintiff

returned

defendants1

earnest money deposit, sold the subject property for $160,000,
an amount squarely in the middle of the Devere Kent appraisal,
and brought this action against defendants to recover his
supposed

damages.

In

return,

counterclaim against defendants.

8

defendants

asserted

their

16.

The trial judge found that, in the course of

negotiations between the defendants and Carol Klas, there
existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing the property at
$165,000, the existence of which was unknown to defendants, and
if known, would have made a material difference to their offer
to buy the subject property.
the

part

of

substantial.

the

This was a unilateral mistake on

defendants

which

fundamental

and

The Devere Kent appraisal was never provided by

Carol Klas in spite of defendants1
appraisals.

was

request

for copies of

(Amended Finding of Fact No. 30, Record at p. 305) .

17.

The

trial

judge

further

found

that,

the

defendants offered a price of $175,000 for the property in
question,

based

upon

representations

made

by

Carol

Klas

regarding three appraisals and without knowledge of the Devere
Kent appraisal.

(Amended Finding of Fact No. 31, Record at p.

306) .

18.

The

defendants

made

no

attempt

to

secure

appraisals on the subject property prior to the time the earnest
money sales agreement was entered into by the parties, because
of representations made by Carol Klas that there were three
appraisals in existence which placed values on the subject

9

property between a low of $175,000 and a high of $192,000.
(Amended of Finding of Fact No. 32, Record at p. 306).

19.

The trial court made the following conclusions of

law:

a.

"The Van Wagoners were mistaken in their

understanding that the lowest existing appraisal on
the property was $175,000." (Conclusion of Law No. 1,
Record at p. 306).

b.

Their

mistake

was

caused

by

their

misunderstanding of the representations made by Carol
Klas, and failure to have the Devere Kent appraisal
provided in a timely manner."

(Conclusion of Law No.

2, Record at p. 306).

c. "The mistake was substantial and fundamental
to the proposed agreement between the defendants and
plaintiff.

If the Van Wagoners had been aware of the

undisclosed, lower appraisal, it would have made a
material
property."

difference

in

their

offer

to

buy

the

(Conclusion of Law No. 3, Record at p.

306) .
10

d.

"The mistake provides a basis for recision

of the Ernest Money Agreement."

(Conclusion of Law

No, 4, Record at p. 306).

20.

The

trial

court

went

on

to

dismiss

the

plaintiff's Complaint, rescind the Ernest Money Agreement and
dismiss the Defendant's Counterclaim.

The trial court also

ordered each side to bear their own costs, attorney fees and
expenses of litigation.

(Conclusions of Law Nos. 5 through 8,

Record at p. 307).

21.

Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal from the

trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Amended Judgment on July 31, 1990. (Record at pp. 316-318).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

A.

DEFENDANTS1 RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS APPEAL

I.

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN TO SHOW CLEAR ERROR BECAUSE
HE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND HAS NOT SHOWN THAT
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING UNILATERAL MISTAKE AND
RECISION.

II.

THERE IS NO BASIS TO OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
AND, THEREFORE, NO BASIS TO REACH THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES.
11

III.

THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S
ATTORNEY FEES WAS PREMISED ON THE TRIAL COURT AWARDING
FEES IN THE FIRST PLACE. THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO SUCH
AWARD AND PURSUANT TO THE PARTIES STIPULATION, PLAINTIFF
IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES.

B.

DEFENDANT'S CROSS-APPEAL

I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT
COMMIT FRAUD IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
OF FACT.

ARGUMENT

I.

REPLY TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF.

POINT I:

The Trial Court's Ruling On Mistake Is Consistent With
and Supported by The Facts Presented At Trial.

In its conclusions of law, the trial court found that
"the Van Wagoners were mistaken in their understanding that the
lowest existing appraisal on the property was $175,000." (Record
at 311).

As a result, the trial court found that a unilateral

mistake of fact sufficient to warrant recision of the Earnest
Money Agreement existed.

12

In his brief on appeal, plaintiff argues that this
conclusion of law could not possibly follow from the evidence
presented at trial and claims that "defendants failed to show
the elements present to allow rescission." (Plaintiff's Brief at
page 14).

In short, plaintiff claims that the trial court's

Findings of Fact are not supported by the evidence presented at
trial.

A.

Plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence
which supports the trial court's findings of
fact.

This Court has made it clear that a trial court's
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
erroneous.

Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App.

1990); Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
As the Court stated in Hoth:

When challenging findings of fact on
appeal, the appellant must show that the
factual findings are clearly erroneous. To
show clear error, the appellant must
marshall all the evidence supporting the
trial court's factual findings and then
demonstrate that the evidence, including
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
is insufficient to support the findings.
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d at 216.

13

Recently, the Utah Supreme Court held:

An appellate court does not lightly disturb
the verdict of a jury nor the findings of
fact made by a trial court. If a challenge
is made to the findings, an appellant must
marshal all the evidence in favor of the
facts as found by the trial court and then
demonstrate that viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the court below,
the evidence is insufficient to support
findings of fact.
Saunders v. Sharp, 154 UAR 5 (Utah Feb. 12, 1991).

While plaintiff argues that the trial court's findings
of fact are erroneous, there is no effort by him, and no basis
in his brief, to support a reversal based on the "clearly
erroneous" standard which governs this appeal.

Rather than

marshall the evidence as this Court requires, plaintiff simply
argues that there is testimony in the record which might support
his theory of the case. Plaintiff's efforts fall woefully short
of carrying his burden of proof to show that given the evidence
as a whole the trial court clearly erred.

Plaintiff has not

even attempted to marshall all the evidence.

When one reads the record the reason for this omission
is obvious.

Plaintiff could not marshal the evidence which

serves as the basis for the trial court's ruling and still claim

grounds for his appeal.

Had plaintiff attempted to meet his

burden and had he revisited all the evidence, it would too
clearly support the trial court's ruling.

B.

The evidence presented at trial supports the
trial court's findings of fact which support the
trial court's ruling on unilateral mistake.

Even though plaintiff failed to meet his burden of
proof and the appeal must be dismissed on that ground alone, it
is helpful to realize how strongly the record supports the trial
court's findings of unilateral mistake.

The evidence is

overwhelming. Indeed, for this Court's convenience, defendants
have annotated the trial court's unilateral mistake findings of
fact to the record of testimony presented at trial.

This

annotation is attached hereto as appendix "A" and incorporated
herein by this reference.

As plaintiff has pointed out, unilateral mistake
involves four elements;
1.

The mistake must be of so grave a consequence
that to enforce the contract as actually made
would be unconscionable.

2.

The matter as to which the mistake was made must
relate to a material feature of the contract.

15

3.

Generally, the mistake must have occurred
notwithstanding
the
existence
of ordinary
diligence by the party making the mistake.

4.

It must be possible to give relief by way of
rescission without serious prejudice to the other
party except the loss of his bargain. In other
words it must be possible to put in the status
quo. (Plaintiff's Brief at page 11, citing Grahn
v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)).

The trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law set forth the factual basis for the ruling or unilateral
mistake.

In pertinent part, the trial court found:

In the course of the negotiations between
the defendants and Carol Klas, there
existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing
the property at $165,000, the existence of
which was unknown to defendants, and if
known,
would
have made
a material
difference to their offer to buy the
subject property. This was a unilateral
mistake on the part of the defendants which
was fundamental and substantial.
The
Devere Kent appraisal was never provided by
Carol Klas in spite of defendants' request
for copies of appraisals. (Record at p.
305). 1

This Finding of Fact is born out by the testimony
presented at trial. As defendants' annotation shows, defendants

1

The court's finding regarding plaintiff's fraud is admitted
here, but will be discussed in defendants' argument on cross-appeal
herein.
16

testified that they specifically asked plaintiff's agent, Carol
Klas, about the existence of appraisals on the subject property
before the earnest money agreement was signed. Mrs. Van Wagoner
testified that during her first contact with Carol Klas on or
about July 25, 1987, she specifically asked Carol Klas if there
were any appraisals on the home.

(Transcript, Vol. II, p. 148,

lines 19-21) . In response, Carol Klas stated that she had three
appraisals.

(Transcript, Volume II, pages 180 through 182). As

Van Wagoner's testified, Carol Klas told the Van Wagoners that
those appraisals indicted the home had an appraisal market value
of somewhere between $175,000 to $192,000.

(Transcript, Volume

I, at page 181-182).

In contrast with that statement, as both plaintiff and
Carol Klas admitted at trial, at the time of Carol Klas1
representations
appraisal

to the Van Wagoners, they kept hidden an

(the "Kent" appraisal) which valued the home at

approximately $153,000 to $165,000, some $10,000 to $20,000
below what Carol Klas had represented as the lowest appraised
value of the home.

(Transcript, Vol. II, p. 42, lines 1-14).

Mr. Van Wagoner testified that, the offer itself was based on
the lowest value of the three represented appraisals.

This

point was critical because Carol Klas represented that John Klas
would not even consider an offer less than the lowest appraised
17

value.

(Transcript, Vol. I, p. 181, lines 19-25, p. 182, lines

1-12). The trial court subsequently found that the existence of
the undisclosed Kent appraisal was material to the Van Wagoner's
decision to make the offer on the home.

(Record at p. 306) .

That is, the Van Wagoners would not have executed the Earnest
Money Agreement in the amount of $175,000 if Carol Klas had
disclosed the Kent appraisal in response to the Van Wagoner's
specific inquiry.

Such testimony supports the trial court's previously
cited Findings of Fact. Those findings of facts, in turn, serve
an appropriate basis for the trial court's Conclusions of Law
that:

1.

The Van Wagoners were mistaken in their
understanding that the lowest existing appraisal
on the property was $175,000.

2.

Their
mistake
was
caused
by
their
misunderstanding of the representations made by
Carol Klas, and failure to have the Devere Kent
appraisal provided in a timely manner.

3.

The mistake was substantial and fundamental to
the proposed agreement between the defendants and
plaintiff.
If the Van Wagoners had been made
aware of the undisclosed, lower appraisal, it
would have made a material difference to their
offer to buy the property.

4.

The mistake provides a basis for rescission of
the earnest money agreement.

18

(Record at p. 306).

Clearly, the evidence supports the trial court's
finding

of

unilateral

mistake.

First,

it

would

be

unconscionable to enforce the contract and allow plaintiff to
profit from the misrepresentations of "appraised" value and the
omission

of

the

Kent

appraisal.

Second,

as

the

court

specifically found, the matter as to which the mistake was made,
the value of the home in question, was material to the contract.
Third,

as

the

court

found,

the mistake

occurred

despite

defendants' requests for appraisals which would have avoided the
mistake.

And fourth, Plaintiff was placed in the status quo.

That is, the contract was rescinded and plaintiff was in the
same position as he was before he entered into the contract with
defendants.

Indeed, plaintiff sold the home after a short

remarketing effort for $160,000, a sum consistent with the Kent
appraisal.

C.

The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Law on
Unilateral Mistake is Correct.

The trial court found that the Earnest Money Agreement
had to be rescinded because of the unilateral mistake which had
occurred relating to the meaning of the term "appraisal". The
trial court found that the mistake was caused whether innocently
19

or not, by the Klas1 use of the word "appraisal".

Plaintiff

argues that the trial court relied on the holding in Guardian
State Bank v. Stanql. 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989) as the basis for
its ruling on unilateral mistake.

Plaintiff then argues that

Stanal is factually distinguishable.

Even if Stanql could be

distinguished factually, Stanal stands for a legal proposition
supports the trial courtfs finding of unilateral mistake.

The Court in Guardian State Bank v. Stanql, 778 P.2d
1

(Utah 1989), specifically agreed with Professor Corbin's

formulation of the law of mistake and showed that in the State
of Utah that legal theory of the law of mistake is controlling.
The Utah Supreme Court quoted from Professor Corbin, stating
that, "There is practically universal agreement that, if the
material mistake of one party was caused by the other, either
purposely or innocently or was known to him, or was of such
character and accompanied by such circumstances that he has
reason to know of it, the mistaken party has a right to
rescission."

3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 610, at 692

(1960) (emphasis added).

Stanql. 778 P.2d at 5.

The Court

relied on Stanql and properly applied Stanql as precedents for
the proposition that even a unilateral mistake can be a complete
defense and afford rescission.
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If anything, factually, the case at bar is more
egregious than Stanal.

In Stangl, for example, the Court

reasoned that Stangl knew of the mistake because he knew the
bank had not intended to become liable on the original note. In
essence, the mistake gave Stangl a windfall. There is evidence
in this case that the Klases engineered the Van Wagoners1
mistake. That was not so in Stangl. Stangl does make it clear,
however, that the mistake in the case at bar constitutes a
complete defense to the earnest money, and rescission is the
only appropriate remedy. Anything else gives Klas a windfall.

Stangl clearly supports the trial court's ruling
rescinding the earnest money on the basis of unilateral mistake.
In addition, the plaintiff misstates consequences of upholding
the trial court's ruling in this case.

The plaintiff states

that "It would be virtually impossible to enforce any contract
if either party chose to come forward and allege that they had
•misunderstood' some aspect of the transaction which they alone
deem to be of great significance."

(Plaintiff's brief at p.

18) . The plaintiff does not understand the law of mistake as it
is applied in the State of Utah.

A misunderstanding of an

aspect of the transaction which one party deems to be of great
significance is not the focus of the law on unilateral mistake.
Rather, according to the holding in Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d
21

320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) , the mistake must be one that the court
views as relating to a material

feature of the contract.

Therefore, it is not just a misunderstanding as to "some aspect
of the transaction" but must a mistake which was material to the
contract.

In the present case the mistake was very material to
the

contract

as

the

contract

price

was

based

upon

the

representations or misrepresentations about the "appraisals"
which had been obtained on the property. The trial court found
that the existence of the Devere Kent appraisal was unknown to
defendants, "and if known, would have made a material difference
to their offer to buy the subject property.

This was a

unilateral mistake on the part of the defendants which was
fundamental and substantial."

(Record at p. 305).

Defendants request that the Court uphold the trial
court's ruling on unilateral mistake as the ruling clearly falls
within the legal standard for unilateral mistake as set forth in
Stangl and Grahn.

POINT II: The Trial Court's Ruling Regarding Plaintiff's Damages
Is Consistent With The Facts Presented At Trial.
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There is no basis to overturn the trial court's
findings, and therefore no basis to reach the issue of damages.
Even if the court were to remand, plaintiff has provided no
sound basis to reevaluate the trial courts ability to calculate
damages but is asking this Court to indulge his wish for more
money on a purely speculative, hypothetical basis.

POINT III:

Plaintiff Is Not Entitled To An Award Of
Attorneys Fees Because The Trial Court Did Not
Award Fees.

The trial court made no award of attorney fees.
Because there was no award, there is nothing for this Court to
sustain or uphold. Plaintiff refers to a stipulation between
the parties, but that stipulation, by its own terms, required
an award of attorney fees for a stipulated amount to take
effect if the trial court awarded fees. Because there was no
award, there is nothing further to be decided.

II.

APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS1 BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL.

POINT 1:

The Trial Courtis Legal Conclusion That Plaintiff
Is
Not
Responsible
For
The
Material
Misrepresentations Of His Agent Is Incorrect.
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The trial court1s findings are clear and plaintiff
does not here dispute those findings.

Nevertheless, the

court's findings compelled a legal conclusion of fraud and the
court's

legal

conclusions

failed

to

follow

its

factual

findings.

A.

The Court's Findings Regarding Carol Klas1
Omission Compel A Legal Conclusion Of Fraud.

The trial court found a false representation of an
existing material fact.

In the trial court's words, "In the

course of negotiations between defendants and Carol Klas,
there existed the Devere Kent appraisal valuing the property
at $165,000, the existence of which was unknown to defendants,
and if known, would have made a material difference in their
offer to buy the subject property.

... The Devere Kent

appraisal was never provided by Carol Klas in spite of
defendant's request for copies of appraisals."

(Amended

Finding of Fact No. 30, Record at p. 305).

It is important to note that the trial court found
that Carol Klas did not disclose information regarding the
appraisals of the subject property when specifically requested
to do so by defendants. (Id.) . "Misrepresentation may be made
either by affirmative statement or by material omission, where
24

there exists a duty to speak." Suaarhouse Finance Company v.
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980).

As the Court in

Suaarhouse points out, the potential victim of fraud must take
steps to inform himself and protect his interests.

Id.

In

this case, the Van Wagoners took those steps when they asked
Carol Klas if there were any appraisals on the home.
relied on Carol's answers as being truthful.
could do no more.
existence

of

Indeed, they

They could not have discovered the

Devere

disclosure of it.

They

Kent

appraisal

without

the

Klas1

In fact, that is the only way they

subsequently discovered the existence of the appraisal.

Carol Klas either knowingly or recklessly failed to
disclose this material fact.

The appraisal existed at the

time the Van Wagoners dealt with Carol Klas. (Amended Finding
of Fact Nos. 5 and 6, Record at pp. 298-299).

In addition,

John Klas admitted that at the time the Devere Kent appraisal
was obtained, Carol Klas was married to him and the purpose of
the appraisal was to secure a second mortgage they were
seeking on their marital residence.
page 32, lines 22-25).

(Transcript, Volume I,

Similarly, Carol Klas admitted that

she knew of the Kent Appraisal a year before the house was to
be sold.

(Transcript, Vol. I, p. 132, lines 4-19.)
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Carol Klas also admitted that she and John met ii
June 1987 to plan the sale of the house and that he gave hei
guidelines to follow.

(Transcript, Vol. I, p. 83, line 16.)

Clearly, the purpose behind hiding the Devere Kent appraisa]
was to induce defendants to offer to the property at thi
higher appraised prices Carol Klas said they had.

It is

critical to this marketing plan to call friends1 opinions
appraisals and to conceal the only real appraisal.

It is n<

coincidence that the amount the Van Wagoners offered was equal
to the what Carol Klas said was the lowest appraised value oi
the home.

(Amended Finding of Fact No. 7-9, Record at pp

299-300.)

Lastly, the trial court specifically found that th<
Van Wagoners relied on Carol Klas1 representations (Amende<
Finding of Fact No. 22, Record at p. 303) , and also found tha*
the non-disclosed information was material to defendants
decision to enter into the contract with plaintiff.

(Amende*

Conclusion of Law Nos. 2 & 3, Record at p. 306).

Given these specific findings, the trial couri
should have concluded that plaintiff committed a fraud on th<
defendants.
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B.

The Court's Legal Conclusion That John Klas Did
Not Make Misrepresentations To The Defendants
Was Incorrect Because John Klas Was Bound By
The Misrepresentations (And Omissions) Of His
Agent Carol Klas, As A Matter Of Law.

The trial court found that Carol Klas acted as
plaintiff's

agent

in

her

transactions

with defendants.

Indeed, the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that
Carol Klas acted as plaintiff's agent.

Carol Klas undertook

the marketing of the home which plaintiff owned in fee.
(Amended Finding of Fact Nos. 2 & 4, Record at p. 238).
Because plaintiff owned the home in fee, Carol only could act
as his agent. Her actions with regard to the sale of the home
evidence this agency relationship: First, she admits she met
in June with John where he gave her certain guidelines to
follow.

(Transcript, Vol I, p. 83, line 16.)

As plaintiff

asserts, Carol Klas advertised the property for sale and held
an "open house" as part of her efforts to sell the house for
plaintiff (Plaintiff's Brief at p. 5; Transcript, Vol. I at
pp. 18-20);

Carol Klas negotiated the sale of the home with

defendants (Amended Finding of Fact Nos. 12, 19, 20, 22, 30,
31 and 32, Record at pp. 300, 302-03 and 305-306); and she
presented the offer for the sale to plaintiff (Amended Finding
of Fact No. 9, Record at p. 299; Plaintiff's Brief at p. 5;
Transcript, Vol. 1 at pp. 21-22; Transcript Vol. II at pp. 9827

99) in anticipation that plaintiff would pay her a finders fee
of 3% of the gross sales price (Plaintiff's Brief at p. 5;
Transcript, Vol. I at pp. 6-8).

It is clear under Utah law that a principal is
responsible for the actions of his agent when those actions
are taken within the scope of the agency.

Jensen v. Manila

Corporation and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav
Saints. 565 P.2d 63, 65 (Utah 1977) ("A representation by a
real estate agent as to the quality of land, or boundary lines
is generally held to be binding on the principal"); see also
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, 801 P.2d
934 (Utah 1989).

Certainly, Carol Klas's actions in dealing

with defendants were taken in the scope of her agency with
plaintiff.

Indeed, it is undisputed that Carol Klas was

acting as plaintiff's real estate agent in the negotiations
with defendants for the purchase of plaintiff's home.

Regardless

of

whether

plaintiff

personally

misrepresented the actual facts which induced defendants to
enter into the contract in question, it is undisputed that
Carol Klas failed to disclose a material fact known to her
when the information was specifically sought by defendants.
That act constitutes the fraud which serves as the basis for
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defendants1 counterclaim.

It is a clear error of law for the

trial court to find that plaintifffs agent omitted to disclose
facts which made her other representations misleading but then
conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff is insulated from
that fraud because he hired an agent, gave her guidelines, and
then stepped back.

In short, the trial court's factual findings follow
the elements of fraud set out in the seminal case of Pace v.
Parrish,

122

Utah

141,

representation

was

made

concerning

existing material

an

247

P.2d

(only

273

three
fact

(1952):

(1) a

appraisals);

(2)

(the existence of

appraisals); (3) which was false (the three appraisals were
only opinions and, moreover, there was a fourth, much lower,
real appraisal); (4) which the representor knew to be false
(Mr. & Mrs. Klas both admit knowledge of the Kent appraisal) ;
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act (they
wanted a high price); (6) the other party, acting reasonably
and in ignorance of it falsity (the Van Wagoners inquired
about appraisals and had no knowledge of the truth); (7) did
in fact rely (the high offer was consistent with the supposed
appraisal) ; (8) and was induced to act (the Van Wagoners
signed the Earnest Money, and then hired architects, craftsmen
and spent money in anticipation of owning the house; and (9)
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to their injury and damage (the Van Wagoners lost thousands of
dollars in out of pocket expenditures).

Under the basic principles of agency, plaintiff is
responsible for the misrepresentations of his agent as if he
had made those misrepresentations himself.

Such a result is

just given the fact that plaintiff can seek relief against his
agent for the fraud which support defendants1 counterclaim.
The trial court's ruling on defendants' counter-claim should
be reversed, judgment entered in favor of defendants on their
counterclaim for fraud and the case remanded to the trial
court for a determination of damages.

CONCLUSION

I.

The Trial Courts Ruling Regarding Unilateral Mistake
Should Be Affirmed.

Plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence and
demonstrate the that the trial court's findings of fact are
clearly erroneous.

Given the testimony and other evidence

presented at trial, it is clear that the trial court's
findings of fact with regard to unilateral
rescission are free from error.
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mistake and

Thus, the trial court's

ruling regarding unilateral mistake and rescission are proper
and should be affirmed.

II.

The Trial Courts Dismissal of the Counterclaim for Fraud
Should be Reversed.

This

Court

should

reverse

the

trial

court's

dismissal of the counterclaim for fraud as John Klas through
his agent, Carol Klas, clearly had a duty to speak when asked
about appraisals, and the omission to disclose the Devere Kent
appraisal constituted fraud.

The nine elements of fraud made clear in Pace v.
Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952) are found here as facts by
the Court.

Here, however, the fraud was principally by

omission which made the other representations misleading.

Defendant respectfully requests that the Court enter
judgment on the counterclaim and remand that part of the case
for a finding of the amount of damage.

DATED this Zo^k day of March, 1991.

VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
Lewis T. Stevens
Alexander H. Walker III
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APPENDIX "A"

What follows is an annotation of the trial court's
Amended Findings of Fact which support the trial court's
ruling on unilateral mistake and rescission.

The paragraphs

are numbered as they appear in the trial court's Amended
Findings of Fact.

This annotation is not intended to be an exhaustive
summary of the evidence which supports all of the trial
court's findings of fact.

Only those findings of fact which

relate to the issue of unilateral mistake and rescission are
listed below. Indeed, some portions of particular findings of
fact are omitted where those portions are irrelevant to the
court's ruling on unilateral mistake.

These annotations

simply indicate that there was sufficient testimony given at
trial upon which the court could base the particular findings
of fact.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT

2.

At all times relevant to the issues involved, the

plaintiff John H. Klas was the owner in fee simple of said
property.
Testimony of John H. Klas: "Q. In the decree of
divorce, as granted were you awarded that home as
your sole and separate property? A. Yes I was."
(Transcript, Vol. I, at p.7, 1.8-11).

1

3.

In late July or early August, 1987, the subject

property was offered for sale pursuant to the terms of a
decree of divorce in Civil No. D-86-1705, in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Testimony of John H. Klas; "Q. When did you first,
to the best of your knowledge, have an occasion to
talk to Carol about your intention to sell the home
or what you expected to get out of it? A. It was
either June or July of 1987." (Transcript, Vol. I,
at p.18, 1.5-9).
"Q. Well, this is what I'm — did there come a
point in time when you had a conversation with her
and told her it was your desire that the home be
exposed to the market and sold? A. There is no
question about that.
That was understood right
from the beginning. Q. But did you tell her that?
A. Yes I did. Q. Would this have been around
June/July time frame of 1987? A. Yes, I would say
June of 1987." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p. 19, 1.1825, p.20, 1.1-3.)
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q.
In approximately
when did the election or the determination come
about when he decided the home would be put on the
market? A. I believe it would have been following
the decree of divorce, because I had to make plans
at that time whether to move out, find a job, and
so we talked about this issue of remaining in the
home and being there. Because he had already moved
out and there would be someone there to show the
home. So, it would have11 been I would say June,
after the middle of June.
(Transcript, Vol. II,
at p.82, 1.25, p.83, 1.1-9).

4.

Pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid Decree

of Divorce, the former wife of the plaintiff, Carol Klas,
undertook the marketing of the property and said property was
not listed with a real estate broker.

The plaintiff John H.

Klas did not set a specific asking price for the property.
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Testimony of John Klas; [Here John Klas reads a
portion of his divorce decree]
"A.
If the
defendant, prior to September 1, 1987, finds a
buyer who is willing and able and ready to purchase
the Berkley Street property at a price and upon
terms acceptable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff
shall pay to the defendant as a one - time finders
fee for her services in showing the house and
finding a buyer a sum equivalent to 3% of the gross
sale price of the residence." (Transcript, Vol. I,
at p.8, 1.2-11).
"Q. After this conversation occurred, do you know
what then transpired or happened from the
standpoint of marketing the property? A. Well, I
was aware of the fact because I drove past the home
on occasion, that there was a sign in front of the
yard that the home was for sale. I was aware of
the fact that she contemplated having open houses
in the home because she had told me that she
intended to do that. I was aware of the fact that
she intended to advertise the home because I saw
the ads in the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret
News advertising the home." (Transcript, Vol. I,
at p.20, 1.17-25, p.21, 1.1-3).
Testimony of Carol Klas:
"Q. And during that
period of time, did you undertake to find a buyer
for the home that you were residing in on Berkley
Street, which is the subject of this litigation?
A. That is correct."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at
p.81, 1.6-10).
"A. He gave me some guidelines to follow. We drew
up an ad. I primarily wrote the ad. He reviewed
it and said it would be acceptable to him. And it
was placed in the Salt Lake in something called the
newspaper agency which incorporates the Deseret and
Salt Lake Tribune." (Transcript, Vol. II, at p.83,
1.16-21).
H

Q. Did you do anything other than put the ad in
the paper? Did you conduct an open house or make
any effort that way? A. I believe, if I recall my
memory, the Sunday indicated open house. I don't
remember having an open house on Saturdays, but I
did it primarily on the weekend. Yes, and I felt
the response was very good, particularly by owner.
. . . Q. When is the first open house that you
can recall that was conducted in connection with
the ad that was placed in the paper? A. About the
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18th of July."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.84,
1.25, p.85, 1.1-7, 1.13-16).
5.

In 1986, plaintiff acquired an appraisal by Devere

Kent (the Kent appraisal) for mortgage loan purposes.

That

appraisal showed a market value of $165,000. In anticipation
of the sale of said property in 1987, plaintiff had personal
acquaintances,

engaged

in real

estate practice, provide

opinion appraisals on the current value of the property which
were oral in nature, and used by plaintiff as a basis for
establishing the market value for sale of the property. Said
opinion appraisals ranged from $175,000 to $192,000.
Testimony of John Klas;
"A.
Mr. Kent is an
appraiser who lives in Kerns, Utah. And what his
qualifications are I am not familiar with.
He
apparently does work for Chase Manhattan Bank.
Carol and I were in the process of applying for a
second mortgage loan on the home prior to our
divorce and Chase Manhattan Bank had asked him to
make an appraisal for the home on it.
Because
banks are extremely conservative in their lending
policies and they want to make sure that the value
is reflected to secure the loan that they are
making. And he was placed to make the appraisal at
the suggestion of Chase Manhattan Bank. Q. Now,
that was in connection with this financing that you
and your then wife, Carol, contemplated?
A.
That's true." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.32, 1.1825, p.33, 1.1-10).
Testimony of Carol Klas:
"Q.
In the Chase
Manhattan item we referred to, was that an effort
to maintain separate financing on the home through
Chase Manhattan? A. That would have been in 86.
Q. That was the efforts; you were going to obtain
some separate mortgage? A. Yes, to pay off some
loans.
Q.
And an appraisal was performed in
connection with that effort? A. Yes. I was not
aware of it at the time because the property was in
my name and John just asked me to come in and sign.
So, I was not aware of the appraisal until some
time later. Q. Sometime later after what? A.
Uhm, perhaps when John and I were discussing what
4

he would enter as a consideration."
Vol. II, at p.130, 1.8-23).

(Transcript,

Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner;
"A. And the
next question I asked was: 'How much is the house?1
and she, right then said, 'We don't have a firm
asking price.'
And I said, 'Do you have any
appraisals?' was my next question. And she said,
'Yes. They range from $175 to somewhere in the low
$190's.' And during that conversation, she told me
about where the three came from. She did not tell
me which one was which. She just mentioned 'One is
from American Savings; that's where John is
employed. Vick Ayers has given us another one. He
is a good friend of Johns. ' He is with Gump &
Ayers so I knew his name. I knew he was well known
in real estate.
And then the third name she
mentioned was Mr. Howard Badger, who was a neighbor
on Berkley Street who had been a principle of
Badger/Jensen Reality for years. So, I knew those
three names from that conversation that Saturday
night.
Q.
Did you specifically ask for
appraisals? A. Yes. Q. You have no doubt in
your mind about that? A. No." (Transcript, Vol.
II, at p.148, 1.15-25, p.149, 1.1-12).

6.

In late July or early August, 1987, the defendants

inspected the property in the presence of Carol Klas and
expressed an interest in acquiring the property.
Testimony of Mark O. Van Wagoner; "Q. And did she
reveal anything else to you as a result of that
initial conversation?
A.
Well, she said that
Carol would be in the house the next day and that
we could go over and look at the house and talk to
her some more about it. Q. Did you go over and
look at the house? A. We did. Q. And how long
did you spend looking at the home and inspecting
it? A. Well, overall we spent a lot of time. On
the next day, I think we spent a good deal of
time."
(Transcript, Vol. I, at p.93, 1.19-25,
p.94, 1.1-4).
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner: "A. Well before
the conversation ended, I asked her if we could
come and see the house. Q. And did you schedule
an appointment? A. Yes for the next day. Q. Did
you go to the house on the next day? A. Yes. Q.
5

What did you do? A. We went through it. And we
liked it. I had never been inside. That was the
first time I had been inside. From the outside, we
had always admired the house. It was attractive
and it was always well maintained. And I think we,
what we were looking for initially, it was just to
see if it would work. Q. On the visit — when did
this visit to the house occur, as best you recall?
A. It was a Sunday and it was in the afternoon. I
believe that the time that Carol said was probably
right. I have no recollection of the exact time.
It was not dark, though. It was not dusky; it was
afternoon. It was a nice, summer afternoon. Q.
Was this on the weekend of the 24th holiday? A.
Yes, it was, the Sunday after tne July 24th
holiday." (Transcript, Vol. II, at p.149, 1.16-25,
p.150, 1.1-15).
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. Alright, and tell
the court, if you will, the first date that you can
recall that the Van Wagoners contacted you with
reference to the subject property? A. The 25th, I
believe. It would have been a Saturday. Q. Of
July? A. Of July. Q. Of 1987? A. That is
correct.
Q.
And how did you recall that
particular date? Is there some way that you can
tie it to that? A. Because it was the day before
my open house on the 26th. And they specifically
asked if they could come over prior to the time. I
think it was listed at 1:30 or 2:00 and they asked
if they could come over before. And I agreed."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.86, 1.7-23).

7.

In the course of defendants1 contact with Carol

Klas, prior to August 11, 1987, references were made to the
effect that she understood "appraisals" had bean made in the
range of $175,000 to $192,000, which defendants believed to be
of a written nature, however, there is a dispute whether
plaintiff or Carol Klas represented that "written" appraisals
existed.
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner:
"A. Well, I
asked Kathryn if they had no price, how could we
know whether we could be interested in the house?
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And she told me that in the conversation with Carol
Klas that she had suggested that their was a range
of market values set by three appraisals of the
property and that some offer in that range of
market value would be acceptable. Q. Did she tell
you what the range was? A. Yes. The range was
from — my recollection is the range was from $170
to the mid $190,s.lf (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.93,
1.9-18).
"We then asked her what the asking price was for
the house. And she told us that she didn't have a
definite asking price; that it had just gone on the
market; that she was marketing the house pursuant
to the decree of divorce; and that she had three
appraisals on the property that ranged in value
from $170,000 to $190,000 — one or three or
something, but it was above $190, but just a little
above $190. She told me and Kathryn, she explained
that Mr. Klas had told her that he would not take
anything outside of that range and that he was
looking for a very substantial offer. We talked
again about the appraisals. And I'll tell you, I
do not recall whether it was at that time that she
said that Mr. Klas had them and that she didn't.
But we discussed the values and were they current
and that sort of thing. She said, yes, that they
were all available and that's why that she felt
good about this range of price." (Transcript, Vol.
I, at p.181, 1.19-25, p.182, 1.1-12).
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner: "A. And I said,
'Do you have any appraisals?'
Was my next
question. And she said, 'Yes, they range from $175
to somewhere in the low $190's." (Transcript, Vol.
II, at p.148, 1.19-21).
Testimony of Carol Klas: "A. Then I believe Mr.
Van Wagoner said to me, 'How did Mr. Klas arrive at
the price of $180,000? How did he arrive at that?'
And I mentioned to him at the time, since I was
involved in a decorative, more of a facilitator
way, I did not know a great deal about the
background of how he arrived at this, but I could
share with him what John had told me. Q. Just
tell us what you told the Van Wagoners in response
to their inquiry? A. To their inquiry about how
we arrived at this. Q. Yes. A. And I mentioned
that Mr. Payne of American Savings and Loan had
seen the home a year before and had drawn up some
type of letter and had given this to Mr. Klas. And
the provisions of that letter were one page. I had
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indicated a year before we had applied for a loan,
and I was aware there was something to qualify for
a loan; that you had to have some kind of
appraisal.
So, I was aware there was something
there but I was very vague on it. I thought that
would be from Chase Manhattan Bank. Howard Badger
had given an opinion to John, which John had shared
with me. Vick Ayers had given an opinion to John.
He had been through the home. And I believe there
was one other opinion that had been raised, plus
the fact that — I just can't recall.
I think
there was one other opinion - Vick Ayers and Howard
Badger. I believe those were the main ones. And
they had all come up. And I believe I said at that
time, 'Mr. Klas is looking at a range from about
$170 up to $190 or a little over $190."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.90, 1.4-25, p.91, 1.116) .

9.

Carol

Klas presented

the

offer

to her

former

husband, John H. Klas, who accepted the same on August 11,
1987, and a closing date of September 15, 1987 was agreed upon
by the parties and the premises were vacated in anticipation
of the closing.

The sales price for the premises was

$175,000, which was the lowest price of the opinion appraisals
provided by Carol Klas.
Testimony of John Klas: "A. Yes. And in early
August, approximately August 7th of 1987, Carol
brought an earnest money agreement signed by Mark
Van Wagoner & Kathryn Van Wagoner to me at my
office." (Transcript, Vol. I. at p.21, 1.14-17).
Testimony of Carol Klas: "Q. And did you then, in
fact, take the document to his office downtown? A.
I did at American Savings. Q. And did you deliver
it to him? A. I did." (Transcript, Vol. II, at
p.98, 1.20-24).

19.

Defendants were unaware of the "Kent" appraisal and

were under the belief that the lowest appraisal referred to by
8

Carol Klas was the lowest appraisal on the property.

The

"Kent" appraisal, if known to the defendants, would have made
a material difference in their offer to buy the subject
property.
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "A. I said,
'The appraisal had come back at $137,000 I need
your appraisals.' Q. What did Mr. Klas respond?
A. He said, 'I'll get them.' Q. What happened
then? A. About thirty minutes later, Mr. Klas
came into my office. Q. And what happened? A.
He had in his hand an appraisal by Devere Kent made
in 1986. He handed it to me and said, 'Here; this
ought to help. ' Q. When was the first time you
saw the Kent appraisal? A. That very moment."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.42, 1.1-14).
Testimony of Kathrvn Van Wagoner: "Q. Mrs. Van
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August who
obtained the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes.
Q. Why didn't you? A. I thought they existed. I
had no reason to doubt that there were no
appraisals. I had no reason. I believe that there
were. And I knew that we would get them. I knew
John had been out of town because Carol had a hard
time reaching him one weekend when she needed to.
She said, 'He must have gone out of town. ' He
didn't tell her, but she said, 'I can't find him; I
can't find him.' I thought that when it came down
to us, we will give him the $1,000. We will make
this offer and we would get all the papers that we
needed. We needed an appraisal; I knew that, to
justify where we were going to be and to go to the
bank and proceed with the transaction. I knew what
we needed." (Transcript, Vol, II, at p.162, 1.321) .

20.

However,

defendants

negotiated

with

plaintiff

through Carol Klas pursuant to paragraph 4 above and pursuant
to plaintiff and Carol Klas' understanding the range would be
the property value of the three highest "appraisals."

9

Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "Q. And did she
reveal anything else to you as a result of that
initial conversation?
A.
Well, she said that
Carol would be in the house the next day and that
we could go over and look at the house and talk to
her some more about it." (Transcript, Vol.1 at
p.93, 1.19-23).
"Q. Is there any doubt in your mind but what at
the time the document was signed by you and your
wife that the sum of $175,000 was disclosed as the
sales price?
A.
Yes, it was disclosed as the
price that Carol told me John would accept if I
offered it to him." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.98,
1.10-15).
"A. Carol Klas told me — and I don't know that
this is true — that John was a very difficult
person; that he would not look kindly on an
exception. That if we wanted to get the house —
and she knew I wanted it — that I would have to
let her show me and lead me through how to get it;
and that there could be no condition, exceptions or
other kinds of things written into the earnest
money." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.101, 1.18-25).
"Q. So, when you were dealing with her, there was
no doubt in your mind but what Mr. Klas was the
owner of the property. A. No." (Transcript, Vol.
I, at p.103, 1.23-25, p.104, 1.1).

22.

Although

the

defendants

had

opportunity

to

investigate the issue of fair market value of the property
prior to execution of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement of
August 7, 1987, they continued to rely upon the existence of
appraisals as represented by Carol Klas regarding the market
value of the property.
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner: "Q. Mrs. Van
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August to
obtain the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes. Q.
Why didn't you question Mark? A. I thought they
existed. I had no reason to doubt that there were
no appraisals. I had no reason. I believe that
10

there were. And I knew we would get them. I knew
John had been out of town because Carol had a hard
time reaching one weekend when she needed to. She
said, he must have gone out of town. He didn't
tell her, but she said, 'I can't find him; I can't
find him. ' I thought when it came down to us, we
will give him the $1,000. We will make this offer
and we would get all the papers that we needed. We
needed an appraisal; I knew that to justify where
we were going to be and go to the bank and proceed
with the transaction.
I knew what we needed."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.162, 1.3-21).

28.

The defendants, however, were negotiating on the

understanding there were appraisals and the appraisals were in
writing.
Testimony of Mark O. Van Wagoner; "Q. I take it
from what I have heard in your counsels opening
statement and other comments, that it is your claim
or contention that there was some representation
about the existence of appraisals as being a
relevant factor in this case, correct? A. That's
correct." (Transcript, Vol. I, at p.101, 1.3-8).
"A. Well, we had some truncated conversations in
which I told Mr. Klas that I had to have the
appraisals that I had been told existed."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.43, 1.8-10).

30.

In the course of negotiations between the defendants

and Carol Klas, there existed the Devere Kent appraisal
valuing the property at $165,000, the existence of which was
unknown to defendants, and if known, would have made a
material
property.

difference

in their

offer

to

buy

the

subject

This was a unilateral mistake on the part of the

defendants which was fundamental and substantial. The Devere
Kent appraisal was never provided by Carol Klas in spite of
11

defendants' request for copies of appraisals. In this regard,
the Court does not find any fraud or misrepresentation on the
part of the plaintiff.
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner:
"Q. Mr. Van
Wagoner, if you will recall before the lunch hour,
we were discussing a telephone conversation between
you and Mr. Cowley on September 23, 1987; do you
recall that? A. Yes. Q. After that telephone
call on September 23rd, what was the next thing
that happened with regard to the Berkley property?
A. Well, I told Kathryn about the $161 offer. And
we talked about whether it would be possible to do
that in view of the fact that there was an
appraisal for $137."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at
p.70, 1.21-25, p.71, 1.1-7).
"A. Well, I decided that based on what Mr. Dimmick
had told me that it would not be possible to use
the $161 figure as a basis, and that I would need
to use the $137 as a basis." (Transcript, Vol. II,
at p.72, 1.4-7).
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner;
"Q. Did you
specifically ask for appraisals? A. Yes. Q. You
have no doubt in your mind about that? A. No."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.149, 1.9-12).

31.

The defendants considered the price of $175,000 as

being a reasonable price for the property in question at the
time the offer to purchase was submitted and executed by them,
based on representations made by Carol Klas and without the
benefit of the Devere Kent appraisal.
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner; "Q. Is there
any doubt in your mind but what at the time the
document was signed by you and your wife that the
sum of $175,000 was disclosed as the sales price?
A. Yes, it was disclosed as a price that Carol
told me John would accept if I offered it to him."
(Transcript, Vol. I, at p.98, 1.10-15).
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32.

The defendants made no attempt to secure appraisals

on the subject property prior to the time the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement was entered into by the parties, because of
representations made by Carol Klas, there were "appraisals" in
existence.
Testimony of Mark 0. Van Wagoner: "Q. Is there
any doubt in your mind but what at the time the
document was signed by you and your wife that the
sum of $175,000 was disclosed as the sales price?
A. Yes, it was disclosed as a price that Carol
told me John would accept if I offered it to him."
(Transcript, Vol. I, at p.98, 1.10-15).
Testimony of Kathryn Van Wagoner; "Q. Mrs. Van
Wagoner, you told Mr. Wall that you made no attempt
to contact Mr. Klas prior to the 11th of August to
obtain the appraisals, is that true? A. Yes. Q.
Why didn't you? A. I thought they existed. I had
no reason to doubt that there were no appraisals.
I had no reason.
I believe that there were."
(Transcript, Vol. II, at p.162, 1.3-10).
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